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Abstract In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium
introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential
equilibrium.We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show
how this can be interpreted as a reﬁnement of sequential equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we deal with the question how a receiver in a signaling game should
react if he observes an unexpected message. In the concept of sequential equilib-
rium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) this is dealt with by requiring that the receiver has
beliefs on information sets that are not reached in equilibrium and that he decides
optimally given these beliefs. However, in signaling games sequential equilibrium
does not put any further restrictions on these beliefs. In order to make the concept
more powerful, several reﬁnements were introduced in literature, such as perfect
sequentialequilibrium(GrossmanandPerry1986),theintuitivecriterion(Choand
Kreps 1987) and divine equilibrium (Banks and Sobel 1987). In all these reﬁne-
ments the idea is that player 2, upon observing an unexpected message, makes
a distinction between “less plausible” and “more plausible” types, and attaches
positive probability only to the more plausible types. Throughout this reasoning
process the utility functions are assumed to be ﬁxed, which implies that player 2
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does not revise his beliefs regarding player 1’s payoffs but only determines the
probabilities of the nodes in the current information set.
Wewillfollowanalternativepath,namelytoinsistonaplayer’sbeliefofhaving
arationalopponent.Thisleadsustoassumethatplayer2hasaconjectureabouthis
opponent’s utility function, which he may revise after observing player 1’s mes-
sage. This revision should be such that the observed message becomes optimal for
player1.Thiswaywedeﬁnethenewconceptofpreferenceconjectureequilibrium,
ﬁrst formalized in Perea (2005). We show that for signaling games the predictions
made by this concept coincide with sequential equilibrium. Thus, our alternative
path can be seen as an alternative foundation for sequential equilibrium.
Next we impose the condition that the revisions should be as limited as pos-
sible, which means that the revised conjectures should be as close as possible to
the initial conjecture.This leads to the concept of minimum revision equilibrium,a
reﬁnement of preference conjecture equilibrium – and hence of sequential equilib-
rium–thatimposesfurtherrestrictionsonthebeliefrevisionsbasedontherevision
index, a measure for the number of revisions required.
2 Preliminaries
For a ﬁnite set Q,  (Q) denotes the set of all probability distributions over Q, and
 0(Q) denotes the set of completely mixed probability distributions over Q.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A signaling game is a tuple S = (T,M,A,p,u 1,u 2) where T, M
and A are ﬁnite sets, p is an element of  0(T), and u1 and u2 are functions from
T × M × A to R.
The game is played as follows. First Nature selects type t ∈ T of player 1 with
probability p(t) > 0. Next player 1, knowing his type, chooses a message m ∈
M. Then player 2, only knowing the probability distribution p, observes message
m and subsequently chooses an action a ∈ A. Finally, player 1 receives payoff
u1(t,m,a)and player 2 receives u2(t,m,a).
2.1 Sequential equilibrium
A pure strategy for player 1 is a map s1 from T to M that speciﬁes a message
s1(t) for every type t. The set of pure strategies for player 1 is denoted by S1.
A mixed strategy for player 1 is an element σ1 in  (S1) and σ1(s1) denotes the
probability that pure strategy s1 is played in σ1. A pure strategy for player 2 is a
map s2 from M to A that speciﬁes an action s2(m) for every message m. The set
of pure strategies for player 2 is denoted by S2, a mixed strategy for player 2 is an
element σ2 in  (S2) and σ2(s2) denotes the probability that s2 is played in σ2.A
system of beliefs of player 2 is a vector β := (β(m))m∈M. In this notation we have
β(m) := (β(t | m))t∈T for each message m, and β(t | m) is the probability player
2 attaches to player 1 being of type t given that player 2 received message m.
A triple (σ1,σ 2,β) is called an assessment. Such an assessment is called a
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should be Bayesian consistent with σ1,1 meaning that for all t, and all m that are
sent with positive probability under σ1,
β(t | m) =
p(t)· σ1(m | t)
 
t ∈T p(t ) · σ1(m | t )
.
Here σ1(m | t):=
 
s1∈S1:s1(t)=m
σ1(s1) is the probability that player 1 plays m when






σ1(s1) · σ2(s2) · u1(t,s1(t),s2(s1(t)))
for player 1 if his type is t, he plays σ1 and player 2 plays σ2 should be maximal. In
other words, given the strategy σ2 of player 2, it should hold that U1(t,σ1,σ 2) ≥
U1(t,τ1,σ 2) for all mixed strategies τ1 and all types t. In this case we say that σ1






σ2(s2) · β(t | m) · u2(t,m,s 2(m))
for player 2 of playing σ2, if he observes message m and has belief β, should be
maximal. Again, in other words, U2(m,σ2,β)≥ U2(m,τ2,β)for all mixed strat-
egies τ2 and all messages m. We say that σ2 is optimal with respect to β in this
case.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Theassessment(σ1,σ 2,β)isasequentialequilibriumifβ isBayes-
ianconsistentwithσ1,σ1 isoptimalwithrespecttoσ2 andσ2 isoptimalwithrespect
to β.2
2.2 Preference conjecture equilibrium
The concept of preference conjecture equilibrium was introduced in Perea (2005)
forgamesinextensiveform.Inthepresentpaperwestudythisconceptforsignaling
games.3 For a detailed discussion of this concept we refer to Perea (2005).
Let μ12 ∈  (S2) be the conjecture that player 1 has at the beginning of the
game about player 2’s choice of strategy and let u12 : T × M × A → R be player
1’sconjectureaboutplayer2’sutilityfunction.Writec12 = (μ12,u 12)fortheentire
conjecture of player 1. Since player 1 moves ﬁrst and only once, he does not need
to revise his conjecture. Player 2 holds conjectures both at the start of the game
as well as at every information set m ∈ M. Depending on the observed message,
player 2 may revise the conjecture held at the beginning. Denote the start of the
game by the symbol h0. We write S1(h0) := S1, and for m ∈ M we write
S1(m) := {s1 ∈ S1 | there exists t ∈ T with s1(t) = m}.
1 In signaling games, Bayesian consistency is equivalent to consistency as deﬁned in Kreps
and Wilson (1982).
2 In the literature this form of optimality is also called sequential rationality, see Kreps and
Wilson (1982).
3 InPerea(2005)thevariantofpreferenceconjectureequilibriumthatwediscusshereiscalled
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Take an m ∈ M∗ := M ∪ {h0}. Let μ21(m) ∈  (S1(m)) denote player 2’s con-
jecture at m about player 1’s strategy choice and let u21(m) : T × M × A → R
be player 2’s conjecture at m about player 1’s utility function. We write c21(m) =
(μ21(m),u21(m)).
Deﬁnition 2.3 The combination c := (c12,(c 21(m))m∈M∗) is called a conjecture
proﬁle.
We introduce the optimality conditions a conjecture proﬁle has to satisfy in
order to be a preference conjecture equilibrium. We start with the condition that
whenever possible player 2 revises his conjecture according to Bayes’rule.A con-







for all s1 ∈ S1(m), and all m ∈ M for which the denominator is strictly positive.
In order to enable players to compute conjectured expected utilities for their
opponent, we make the (informal) assumption that conjectures are common belief.
In particular, we assume that player 2’s (undeﬁned) conjecture about player 1’s
conjecture about player 2’s choice of strategy coincides with player 1’s conjecture
about player 2’s choice of strategy, and vice versa.
Given this assumption, consider an m ∈ M∗. The conjecture of player 2 at
m about player 1’s expected utility if player 1 has type t and plays pure strategy
s1 must now be equal to U21(m)(t,s1,μ 12), where U21(m) is the expected payoff
function given payoff function u21(m). A pure strategy s1 of player 1 is optimal
with respect to μ12 and u21(m) if for each type t and for all s 
1 ∈ S1 it holds that
U21(m)(t,s1,μ 12) ≥ U21(m)(t,s 
1,μ 12).
The conjecture of player 1 regarding the expected utility of player 2 at information







μ21(m)(s1) · u12(t,m,s 2(m))
because the assumption of common belief of conjectures requires μ21(m) to be the
conjecture of player 1 regarding the conjecture of player 2. The pure strategy s2 is
said to be optimal with respect to μ21(m) and u12 if for all s 
2 ∈ S2 it holds that
U12(m,μ21(m),s2) ≥ U12(m,μ21(m),s 
2).
Deﬁnition 2.4 A conjecture proﬁle c is a preference conjecture equilibrium if it
satisﬁes Bayesian updating, and moreover
1. for every m ∈ M∗, μ21(m)(s1)>0 implies that s1 is optimal w.r.t. μ12 and
u21(m)
2. for every m ∈ M, μ12(s2)>0 implies that s2 is optimal w.r.t. μ21(m) and u12.
Observe that in this deﬁnition optimality on the part of player 2 is not required
at the start of the game. It is easy to verify that this is implied by the second part
of the deﬁnition in combination with Bayesian updating.Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games 377
3 Relation with sequential equilibrium
In this section we show that in a signaling game each preference conjecture equi-
librium induces in a natural way a sequential equilibrium and that conversely
each sequential equilibrium is induced this way by at least one preference conjec-
ture equilibrium. In particular this shows that a preference conjecture equilibrium
always exists. First we explain how a preference conjecture equilibrium induces a
sequential equilibrium. To this end, take a conjecture proﬁle
c = (μ12,u 12,(μ 21(m),u21(m))m∈M∗).
The assessment (σ1,σ 2,β)is said to be induced by the conjecture proﬁle c if
σ1 = μ21(h0) and σ2 = μ12 (1)
and for all types t and messages m,






s1:s1(t )=m p(t ) · μ21(m)(s1)
. (2)
The denominator in the deﬁnition of β is automatically positive. The deﬁnitions in
(1) state that in the induced sequential equilibrium a player should actually play
whathisopponentconjectureshimtoplay.Giventhesechoices,equality(2)simply
follows from Bayesian updating.
Theorem 3.1 Let S = (T,M,A,p,u 1,u 2) be a signaling game and let c be a
preference conjecture equilibrium with u21(h0) = u1 and u12 = u2. Then the
assessment induced by c is a sequential equilibrium in S.
Proof We ﬁrst show that σ1 is optimal with respect to σ2.Take a type t ∈ T, a pure
strategy s1 ∈ S1 with σ1(s1)>0 and an arbitrary strategy s 
1 ∈ S1. It sufﬁces to
show that
U1(t,s1,σ 2) ≥ U1(t,s 
1,σ 2).
To this end, notice that also μ21(h0)(s1)>0, because σ1 = μ21(h0). So, because
c is a preference conjecture equilibrium, it follows that s1 is optimal with respect
to μ12 and u21(h0). In particular,
U21(h0)(t,s1,μ 12) ≥ U21(h0)(t,s 
1,μ 12).
Withu21(h0)=u1andσ2 =μ12thismeansexactlythatU1(t,s1,σ 2)≥U1(t,s 
1,σ 2).
Next, we show that σ2 is optimal with respect to β. Let m be a message, take
a pure strategy s2 with σ2(s2)>0 and a pure strategy s 




Since μ12(s2) = σ2(s2)>0 and c is a preference conjecture equilibrium, we know
that s2 is optimal w.r.t. μ21(m) and u12. So, in particular
U12(m,μ21(m),s2) ≥ U12(m,μ21(m),s 
2).378 T. Schulteis et al.



















p(t ) · μ21(m)(s1)
⎤
⎦ · U2(m,s 
2,β)
Hence, since the bracketed factor is always positive and the same for both s2 and
s 
2, we see that U2(m,s2,β)≥ U2(m,s 
2,β).
Finally, we show that β is Bayesian consistent with σ1. Take a message m and
a type t.Assume that
 
t ∈T p(t )σ1(m | t )>0. We will show that
β(t | m) =
p(t)· σ1(m | t)
 
t ∈T
p(t ) · σ1(m | t )
.









Hence, using the fact that c satisﬁes Bayesian updating to get the second equality,




















s1:s1(t)=m p(t ) · σ1(s1)
=
p(t)· σ1(m | t)
 
t ∈T p(t ) · σ1(m | t )
which shows that β is Bayesian consistent with σ1.    
Conversely, for every sequential equilibrium there is a preference conjecture
equilibrium that induces this equilibrium as the next theorem states. Since we
prove a somewhat stronger result in the second part of Theorem 4.3, we postpone
the proof to the next section.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that the assessment (σ1,σ 2,β)is a sequential equilibrium
of a signaling game S = (T,M,A,p,u 1,u 2). Then there exists a preference
conjecture equilibrium (μ12,u 12,(μ 21(m),u21(m))m∈M∗) with u21(h0) = u1 and
u12 = u2 that induces (σ1,σ 2,β).
4 Minimum revision equilibrium
In a preference conjecture equilibrium player 2 can revise his conjecture about
the utilities and strategies of player 1. Intuitively, one would like to keep these
revisions as limited as possible. In this section we propose a way to measure this,
and we study the resulting reﬁnement of preference conjecture equilibrium and the
associated reﬁnement of sequential equilibrium.Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games 379
A (weak) ordering on a ﬁnite set E is a complete and transitive binary relation
onE.ForanorderingR wedenotebyP andI itsasymmetricandsymmetricparts,
respectively. For x,y ∈ E, the expressions xRy, xPy, and xIy, are interpreted as
‘x is weakly preferred to y’, ‘x is strictly preferred to y’, and ‘x is equivalent to
y’. Let R and R  be two orderings. Deﬁne
d(x,y) :=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i f xPy and not xP y
1i f xIy and not xI y
1i f yPx and not yP x
0 otherwise.









Now consider a conjecture proﬁle c = (μ12,u 12,(μ 21(m),u21(m))m∈M∗). In this
proﬁletheconjectureofplayer2ininformationsetmregardingtheexpectedutility
function of player 1’s type t is given by
U21(m)(t,m ,μ 12) :=
 
s2∈S2
μ12(s2) · u21(m)(t,m ,s 2(m )).
The preference ordering Rt
m on M for type t is deﬁned by, for all k,l ∈ M
kRt
ml if and only if U21(m)(t,k,μ12) ≥ U21(m)(t,l,μ12).
Now, the distance d(Rt
h0,Rt
m) between the orderings Rt
m and Rt
h0 counts the num-
berof‘utilitychanges’player2makesfortypet ofplayer1ifheobservesmessage










reﬁnement of preference conjecture equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let c be a preference conjecture equilibrium with u12 = u2 and
u21(h0) = u1. Then c is a minimum revision equilibrium if d(c) ≤ d(c ) for all
preference conjecture equilibria c  with u 
12 = u2 and u 
21(h0) = u1.
Since a preference conjecture equilibrium always exists by Theorem 3.2, it
follows that a minimum revision equilibrium always exists.380 T. Schulteis et al.
4.1 Relation with sequential equilibrium
Since any preference conjecture equilibrium induces a sequential equilibrium by
Theorem 3.1, the concept of minimum revision equilibrium can be used to obtain
a reﬁnement of sequential equilibrium.This works as follows.The expected utility





σ2(s2) · u1(t,m,s 2(m)).
Now, for a sequential equilibrium (σ1,σ 2,β)of S, let R(σ1,σ 2,β)denote the set
of triples (t,m,m  ) in T × M × M for which β(t | m) > 0 and U1(t,m,σ 2)<
U1(t,m ,σ 2).
Deﬁnition 4.2 Therevisionindexof(σ1,σ 2,β)isdeﬁnedasthenumber|R(σ1,σ 2,
β)| of elements of the set R(σ1,σ 2,β). It is denoted by r(σ1,σ 2,β).
If (t,m,m  ) is in R(σ1,σ 2,β), player 2 believes that type t has positive proba-
bility although the observed message m is inferior to m  for t. If player 2 believes
that player 1 is rational he should make some ‘revision’in order to rationalize this.
This explains the term ‘revision index’ in Deﬁnition 4.2. The following theorem
justiﬁes the use of this particular expression.
Theorem 4.3 LetS = (T,M,A,p,u 1,u 2)beasignalinggameandlet(σ1,σ 2,β)
be a sequential equilibrium in S. If a preference conjecture equilibrium c with
u12 = u2 and u21(h0) = u1 induces (σ1,σ 2,β), then d(c) ≥ r(σ1,σ 2,β). More-
over, there is a preference conjecture equilibrium c with u12 = u2, u21(h0) = u1
and d(c) = r(σ1,σ 2,β)that induces (σ1,σ 2,β).
Proof (a)Letcbeapreferenceconjectureequilibriumwithu12 = u2andu21(h0) =
u1 whichinduces(σ1,σ 2,β).Takeanelement(t,m,m  )inR(σ1,σ 2,β).Itsufﬁces
to show that mRt
mm  and m P t








m) ≥ |R(σ1,σ 2,β)| = r(σ1,σ 2,β).
In order to show that mRt
mm , note that β(t | m) > 0 because (t,m,m  ) is an
element of R(σ1,σ 2,β). So, by (2), there exists an s1 ∈ S1 such that s1(t) = m and
μ21(m)(s1)>0. Since c is a preference conjecture equilibrium, this implies that
U21(m)(t,m,μ12) ≥ U21(m)(t,m ,μ 12)
and hence Rt
m orders m weakly above m . On the other hand, U1(t,m,σ 2)<
U1(t,m ,σ 2) since (t,m,m  ) is an element of R(σ1,σ 2,β). This is equivalent to
U21(h0)(t,m,μ 12)<U 21(h0)(t,m ,μ 12)
and hence Rt
h0 orders m strictly below m .
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as follows. For player 1 we deﬁne μ∗
12 := σ2 and u∗
12 := u2. For player 2, we take
μ∗
21(h0) := σ1 and u∗










u1(t,m ,a)+ 1 i fl=ma n dmoreover there exists an
m ∈M with (t,m,m  )∈R(σ1,σ 2,β)
u1(t,l,a) else.
In the deﬁnition of μ∗
21(m) we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 Suppose there exists an s1 ∈ S1(m) such that σ1(s1)>0. Then we deﬁne
μ∗



















1 (t ) :=
 
m if t  = t
s∗
1(t ) if t   = t.
Clearly, all strategies s
t,m
1 are elements of S1(m) and s
t,m
1  = s
t ,m
1 whenever t  = t .




p(t) if s1 = s
t,m
1












for all pure strategies s1 ∈ S1(m). The denominator is not equal to zero, because
there is at least one type t with β(t | m) > 0, and for this type μ21(m)(s
t,m
1 )>0
while indeed st,m ∈ S1(m).
Weshowthatc∗isapreferenceconjectureequilibriumwithd(c∗) = r(σ1,σ 2,β)
that induces (σ1,σ 2,β). First we show that c∗ induces (σ1,σ 2,β).We only have to
prove (2). Let t ∈ T and m ∈ M. In Case 1,
β(t | m) =
p(t)· σ1(m | t)
 








s1:s1(t )=m p(t ) · μ∗
21(m)(s1)
,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from Bayesian consistency of β with σ1 and the
second one from the deﬁnitions of σ1(m | t)and μ∗
21(m). In Case 2,382 T. Schulteis et al.
β(t | m) =
β(t | m)
 















s1:s1(t )=m p(t ) · μ∗
21(m)(s1)
,
so also in this case (2) holds. Hence, c induces (σ1,σ 2,β).
Next we show that d(c∗) = r(σ1,σ 2,β). Let t ∈ T and m ∈ M. If there is
no m  with (t,m,m  ) ∈ R(σ1,σ 2,β), then u∗




m) = 0. Otherwise, consider an m  ∈ M with (t,m,m  ) ∈ R(σ1,σ 2,β).
Then, by deﬁnition of R(σ1,σ 2,β),w eh a v eβ(t | m) > 0 and U1(t,m,σ 2)<










21(h0)(t,m ,s 2(m ))
and Rt




u1(t,m  ,a)+ 1
and u∗
21(m)(t,m ,a) = u1(t,m ,a)for all a ∈ A. Hence, Rt
m orders m strictly
above m  and it orders any two messages different from m in the same way as Rt
h0.




    
m  ∈ M | U1(t,m,σ 2)<U 1(t,m ,σ 2)
    .
Summing up over all messages m and all types t, and using the fact that
d(Rt
h0,Rt




   {m  ∈ M | U1(t,m,σ 2)<U 1(t,m ,σ 2)}







Finally we show that c∗ is a preference conjecture equilibrium. First note that
μ∗







21(m) is deﬁned by Case 1, and hence c∗ satisﬁes Bayesian updating.
Secondly, we show part 2 of Deﬁnition 2.4. Take an m ∈ M and an s2 ∈ S2
with μ∗
12(s2)>0. Since σ2(s2) = μ∗
12(s2)>0, optimality of σ2 with respect to β
implies that U2(m,s2,β)≥ U2(m,s 
2,β)for all s 




β(t | m) · u2(t,m,s 2(m)),
together with (2) and u∗
12 = u2, we see for all s 


























Hence, s2 is optimal for player 2 with respect to μ∗
21(m) and u∗
12.Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games 383
Thirdly we show part 1 of Deﬁnition 2.4. Let s1 ∈ S1.I fμ∗
21(h0)(s1)>0 then
σ1(s1)>0, so optimality of σ1 with respect to σ2 yields that s1 is optimal with
respect to σ2 in the game S. Hence s1 is optimal with respect to μ∗
12 = σ2 and
u∗
21(h0) = u1.
Take an m ∈ M and assume that μ∗
21(m)(s1)>0. We will show that s1 is
optimal for player 1 with respect to μ∗
12 and u∗
21(m).
First consider Case 1 in the deﬁnition of μ∗




21(m) = u1. Since we are in Case 1, there is an s 
1 ∈ S1(m) with σ1(s 
1)>0.
Thus, m is played with positive probability under σ1. Then the optimality of σ1
with respect to σ2 implies that
 
(t,m ) ∈ T × M | β(t | m) > 0 and U1(t,m,σ 2)<U 1(t,m ,σ 2)
 




1) = 0foralls 
1 ∈ S1(m).Sinceμ∗
21(m)(s1)>0,
in this case s1 = s
t,m
1 for a unique t ∈ T. So, β(t | m) > 0 for this t, by deﬁnition
of μ∗
21(m), μ21(m) and s
t,m
1 . We distinguish two subcases.
First, suppose that message m is not optimal for t with respect to σ2 and u1.
Then there exists an m  ∈ M such that U1(t,m,σ 2)<U 1(t,m ,σ 2), and therefore




u1(t,m  ,a)+ 1 >u 1(t,m ,a)= u∗
21(m)(t,m ,a)
for all a and m   = m. Thus, s1(t) = s
t,m
1 (t) = m is optimal for type t w.r.t u∗
21(m),
even regardless of what μ∗
12 is. Next, consider any other t   = t. By the choice of
s∗
1(t ) in the deﬁnition of s
t,m
1 , message s1(t ) = s
t,m
1 (t ) = s∗
1(t ) is optimal for t 
w.r.t. σ2 and u1. Since t   = t,w eh a v eu∗




Secondly, suppose that m is optimal for t with respect to σ2 and u1. Then
there exists no m  such that (t,m,m  ) ∈ R(σ1,σ 2,β). Hence, u∗
21(m) = u1, and
s1(t) = s
t,m
1 (t) = misoptimalw.r.t.μ∗
12 andu∗
21(m).Theargumentfortypest   = t
is identical to the previous case.    
We conclude with a few direct consequences of Theorem 4.3. A sequential
equilibrium (σ1,σ 2,β)in a signaling game S = (T,M,A,p,u 1,u 2) is called a
minimum revision sequential equilibrium if it minimizes the revision index among
all sequential equilibria of the game.
Corollary 4.4 IfcisaminimumrevisionequilibriuminS,thentheinducedsequen-
tialequilibriumisaminimumrevisionsequentialequilibrium.Conversely,forevery
minimum revision sequential equilibrium (σ1,σ 2,β)there exists a minimum revi-
sion equilibrium c with u21(h0) = u1 and u12 = u2 that induces (σ1,σ 2,β).
Further,whenunderσ1 eachinformationsetofplayer2isreachedwithpositive
probability, R(σ1,σ 2,β) will be empty and (σ1,σ 2,β) is a minimum revision
sequential equilibrium with revision index 0. Finally, it can be shown in exam-
ples that minimum revision sequential equilibrium has no logical relation to the
intuitive criterion.384 T. Schulteis et al.
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